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Abstract
Since the early 1980s,  dramatic changes in  export  of reforms related to these  markets.  But there  are general
commodity markets, shocks associated  with resulting  lessons  as well.  The authors find that the key
price declines, and changing views on the role of the  consequences  of reform  have been significant  changes in
state have  ushered in widespread  reforms to agricultural  or emergence  of marketing  institutions and  a significant
commodity markets in  Africa. The reforms significantly  shift of political and economic  power from  the public to
reduced government participation  in the marketing and  the private sector.  In cases where interventions  were
pricing of commodities.  Akiyama,  Baffes,  Larson, and  greatest and reforms most complete,  producers have
Varangis examine  the background, causes,  process, and  benefited  from receiving a larger  share of export prices.
consequences of these reforms and derive lessons for  Additionally,  the authors conclude that the adjustment
successful  reforms from  experiences  in markets for four  costs of reform can  be reduced  in  most cases by better
commodities  important to Africa-cocoa,  coffee,  cotton,  understanding  the detailed  and idiosyncratic
and sugar.  The authors' commodity focus highlights  the  relationships  between the commodity subsector,  private
special  features associated with these markets that affect  markets, and public services.  Finally,  while  there are
the reform  process.  They complement the current  significant  costs to market-dependent  reforms,
literature  on market reforms in  Africa,  where grain-  experiences  suggest that they  are a necessary  step toward
market studies are  more common.  The authors suggest  a dynamic commodity sector based on private initiative.
that the types of market interventions  prior to reform are  This is particularly true in countries  and sectors where
more easily classified by crop than by country.  interventions were  greatest and market-supporting
Consequently,  there  are significant commodity-specific  institutions the weakest.
differences  in the initial conditions and in the outcomes
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1.  INTRODUCTION
As a result of reforms initiated in the mid-198os, there has been a sea change on how
agricultural export commodities are marketed and financed in many African countries.
The reforms have had profound ramifications for the roles of the government and the
private sector, and hence for all the institutions related to agriculture.
Generally, market reforms are intended to boost an economy's efficiency - that
is, to enhance the productivity of human talents and physical assets.  In turn, these
improvements in efficiency are expected to generate growth that improves the lives of
many and especially the poor.  In practice, reform has meant relying more heavily on
markets to direct how resources are used and to direct future investments.  In the
context of this paper, the term market reform refers to steps taken toward opening
domestic and export markets to competition and toward putting in place public and
private institutions consistent with and supportive of private markets.  For commodity
markets, market reform has meant reducing government involvement in marketing and
in production, increasing participation of the private sector in these activities and
reducing distortions in commodity prices - especially producer prices.  Measures
implemented to achieve these goals have varied but often they included elimination or
privatization of government marketing agencies, the introduction of competition in
marketing, the elimination of administered prices, reduction in explicit and implicit
taxes, and the privatization of government-owned assets.
Events triggering commodity market reforms were not independent of broader
political and economic changes in most countries and the consequences of reform are
often linked as well.  However, issues related to the approaches and effects of general
and agricultural market reforms have been discussed elsewhere and receive minimal
treatment here.  Instead, our purpose is to discuss reform in the specific context ofcocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar markets, and to provide lessons by selectively drawing
on African cross-country experiences in those marketsl.
A central theme of this paper is that commodity markets warrant special
attention for several reasons.  First, commodities play an especially important role in
many developing countries, especially in Africa.  Reforms and the process of reform of
commodity markets can affect communities and sometimes economies in significant
ways.  Conversely, it was the fiscal consequences of a sharp commodity price decline in
the 1980s and the early  9ggos that triggered economy-wide reforms in many African
countries.  Second, these markets illustrate well how special features  - based in part on
the production characteristics of the commodities and in part on historic developments
- can affect the reform process and illustrate the importance of taking initial conditions
into account when designing reform.  Third, experience from commodity markets also
illustrates how long-standing interventions like marketing boards and the public
ownership of processing facilities can crowd out markets and institutions that support
private initiative.  Lessons on how private markets and policymakers cope with missing
markets and institutions are noteworthy.  Finally, close examination of reform at the
commodity level illustrates the practical ways that changes in marketing systems often
leads to a diffusion of political power as market participants take part in setting industry
rules, standards, and policy.  This is significant, since it provides commodity sector
participants greater autonomy to adapt to future events.
The commodities chosen for analysis in this paper are coffee, cocoa, cotton, and
sugar.  We focus on these commodities because of their importance for African
countries.  As for the country coverage, the paper focuses exclusively on Africa because
(i) it is the region that depends most on primary commodities as sources of export
revenues and employment;  (ii) significant market reform for the four commodities has
occurred in this region in recent years; and (iii) it is where development effort is most
needed because of its low income levels and weak physical and institutional
infrastructure.
lThis paper draws on African experiences of market reform, some of which are included in a more general
discussion by Akiyama, Baffes,  Larson and Varangis (2001.)
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief and
general description of the types of prevalent market interventions and the motivation
for those interventions prior to recent reforms.  Section III discusses what prompted
recent reforms.  Section IV examines the consequences of reform.  Section V points out
the scope and likely success of commodity market reform and discusses important
lessons for managing the reform process.  Section VI concludes.
2. THE RISE OF COMMODITY MARKET INTERVENTIONS
Several factors - political and economic events and development approaches -
contributed to the presence of governments in commodity markets during the second
half of the twentieth century.  In many countries, primarily in Africa, governments
inherited control of agricultural commodities, along with supporting institutions, from
their colonial past.
Often government control came in the form of marketing boards, but also
included government-run plantations and industries.  Often marketing boards are
viewed one of several instruments designed to promote and protect colonial interest
(Clarence-Smith,  i995).  However it is worth noting that the rise of marketing boards in
Africa coincided with the view that agricultural and commodity markets benefited from
interventions - a view based on developed country experiences following the Depression
and World War 112.
Several themes from development theory as well as practical political
considerations supported continued intervention.  Many developing countries, held a
strong belief in state-dominated economic development.3  Moreover, governments
frequently pursued policies that taxed agriculture in order to promote industrial
development.  This approach seems to have been supported by several development
2  Harriss-White,  1995, makes a similar point, arguing that the original purpose of the colonial grain
marketing regulations was to better organize grain for export.  -
3  The 1997 World Development Report, The Changing  Role of  the State, examines the rise of central
planning and the belief by policymakers of many developing  countries after independence that  (the)
state would mobilize resources and people and direct them toward rapid growth...  State control of
the economy, following the example of Soviet Union, was central to this strategy.  Many [Asian],
Latin American, Middle Eastern and African countries followed this state-dominated
[industrialization path].  (p. 23, World Bank, 1997).
3economists' views in the 1950s (Lewis, 1954; Hirschman,  1958).  In addition, arguments
by Prebisch (1949) and Singer (1950) that the terms of trade of commodities had been
and would continue to decline over time encouraged discriminatory policies against
agriculture in order to more quickly shift resources out of agriculture.  Intervention
garnered support for practical and political reasons as well.  For one thing, the systems
often proved useful for collecting taxes and providing political patronage (Bates, 1981).
Indeed, for some countries, taxing commodity exports provided the most convenient
and practical way to support the state budget.  The government-controlled system, often
combined with misaligned exchange rates, provided financial benefits to the urban elite
who formed important allies to politicians (Lipton, 1977 and Bates, 1981).
For many African countries, one or two commodities were especially important in
terms of employment, export income and government revenues.  Governments
considered these markets too important, both politically and economically, to be left to
the private sector.  Most commonly, government control of marketing was implemented
through a monopolistic parastatal buying and exporting agency or through controlling
of the activities of private traders using regulations and licenses.  The state through
institutional arrangements sought to control the flow of commodities and domestic
prices (producer and consumer).  The stated objectives of the control over marketing
were to protect farmers and consumers from exploitation by merchants and middlemen,
reduce price fluctuations, and ensure tax and foreign exchange revenues.  The latter was
critical since several developing countries implemented foreign exchange controls
resulting in large premiums for hard currencies.  Government control of key markets
also extended to public ownership of key processing and transport facilities.  Sometimes
state ownership was viewed as a way of protecting farmers from the local monopolies of
privately owned processing facilities.  Because export commodities and the hard
currencies that they earned passed through a limited number of ports, processing plants
and banks, controls on these markets were more effective than similar controls on other
agricultural products.
Not all policy measures were domestically motivated.  Commodity producing and
often consuming countries sought to stabilize commodity prices.  Keynes (1943) viewed
commodity booms and busts as a significant source of economic instability and
4advocated interventions.  Theoretical findings by Johnson (1953)  and Bhagwati  (1958)
that declining prices associated with expanding exports could slow growth were also
used to support calls for interventions4.  For resource rich and commodity dependent
countries, interventions were recommended to counter Dutch Disease problems.  (See
Corden, 1984, for an early synthesis of the literature.)
The interventions mainly took the form of quota or buffer stock programs
organized through international commodity agreements (Larson, Varangis and Yabuki,
1998).  The IMF offered lending instruments to cope with unexpected revenue shortfalls
beginning in 1963, as did the EU for selected countries - including several in Africa -
under the 1975 Lome Agreement.  The successful attempts by OPEC in 1973 to raise
crude oil prices gave added motivation for collective action among commodity
producers and prompted the launch by UNCTAD in 1975 of the Integrated Program for
Commodities.  The program attempted to stabilize the prices of major commodities
exported by developing countries (including coffee, cocoa and natural rubber) primarily
through buffer stock operations under international commodity agreements and led
eventually to the establishment of the Common Fund for Commodities.  The IMF
offered a lending program to support commodity stabilization programs beginning in
1969.
3. WHAT PROMPTED  MARKET REFORMS?
Though largely triggered by sudden and often unpredicted political and economic
events, the commodity market reforms of recent years also reflect an evolution in
development economists' views on the importance of agriculture to economic
development and on the role of government in the development process.  The change in
philosophy was reinforced and partly motivated by the increasingly evident
inefficiencies of interventionist policies.  Further, structural changes in commodity
markets, generated by changing production, transportation and information
technologies, brought increasing pressure to bear on interventionist instruments as
world commodity prices declined during the 1980s and l990s. Hence, policies to get
4 This general problem became known as the adding-up or fallacy of composition problem.  See Cline,
1982, for an early exposition.
5prices right became a special concern in the early 1g80s especially with the introduction
of structural adjustment lending by the Bretton Woods institutions.  This section
discusses these common themes as well as the events specific to the commodities
covered in this paper that influenced the pace and chosen approaches to commodity
market reforms.
Geneir&i  cnusea
Not all economists agreed with the prevailing views of government intervention and
price controls in commodity markets.  Johnson (1947, p. 31), for example, argued that
prices should not be used as goals to be achieved and that agricultural sectors required
few interventions.  Further, Friedman (1954) disputed the benefits of managing
commodity income variability.  Johnson and Mellor (1961)  attacked the pro-urban
policy and neglect of agriculture prevalent in many developing countries.  Bauer (1976)
and Lal (1985) criticized government controlled pricing and marketing systems.  Bates
(1981) argued that in order for rural communities to prosper, most developing
government policies concerning markets would need to change5.
These arguments were given an institutional voice by the World Bank through a
series of publications.  The first was the release of its 1983 World Development Report,
which concluded that policy interventions slowed growth (World Bank, 1983, chapter 4).
Later, the 1985 World Development Report focused specifically on the problems
associated with agricultural policy interventions by both developed and developing
countries.  In 1992, a series of developing country studies edited by Krueger, Schiff and
Valdes examined in detail the extent of distortions affecting the agricultural sector
introduced through sector-specific and macroeconomic policies in 18 developing
countries.
Concurrently,  researchers also focused on how pricing policies distort related
markets for services and inputs, for example Gersovitz (1989, 1992).  Other writers
focused on the historic inability of governments to manage the revenues and shortfalls
5 Bates (1989) also argued that markets adjust automatically, leaving the realignment of government
institutions as the real task of structural adjustment.
6associated with commodity cycles.  Gelb (1988) provided an influential set of case
studies and Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1992) provided a detailed study of Kenya's
coffee boom during the late 197Os6 .
As development economists' preference for market-based policy instruments
grew, a number of political and economic events reinforced the notion that market
interventions stifled growth and economic opportunity and created an opportunity for
reform.  These include the successful adoption of more market-oriented domestic
agricultural policies in China, the failure of several commodity agreements,  and the
collapse of the Soviet Union.  Additional factors also encouraged change, including
accumulated debt burdens in Latin America and Africa and increased activism by the
international financial institutions to bring about policy changes.
Following the failed Great Leap Forward, China adopted a more market-based
approach to domestic agriculture, making noticeable progress by the 1970S.7  China's
success and the success of the agricultural sectors of other East Asian countries were not
strictly interpreted as an endorsement of free trade but the outcomes did reflect an
increased reliance on market mechanisms.  Moreover, by the late 1980s, the economic
performances of these countries were often contrasted with the government-controlled
systems of Sub-Saharan Africa (Wallace, 1997; Lindauer and Roemer, 1994).
The economic problems of the Soviet Union, evident by the mid-1g8os, and its
eventual collapse shook policymakers' belief in government-lead and government-
controlled economic development strategies.  This had a significant impact on both
philosophy and implementation of economic and political systems in many developing
countries and in Eastern Europe.
A similar sea change occurred in international commodity markets.  The buffer
stock programs planned under UNCTAD's Integrated Program for Commodities proved
unsuccessful for structural and political reasons and the Common Fund was never put to
its intended use.  Other international  agreements that existed with the aim of stabilizing
6 Schuknecht (1999) includes a review of recent literature on windfalls and custodial governments.
7  With regard to China's agricultural productivity and production growth, the World Bank (1993) noted,
reforms giving farmers greater control over the land they tilled, together with a 25 percent real
increase in crop prices, boosted agricultural productivity (p. 59).
7or raising commodity prices also faced difficulties and eventually collapsed.  For
example, the buffer stock provisions of the International Tin Agreement,  International
Cocoa Agreement (ICCA), the International Rubber Agreement and the quota-
mechanism of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) failed and member countries
chose to dismantle them.
At the same time, prices declined sharply in international markets for most
commodities.  For some commodities - especially coffee - the declines were due mainly
to the release of policy-driven inventories following the collapse of the commodity
agreements (Reinhart and Wickham, 1994).  In turn, the price declines caused
significant fiscal and balance of payments problems for commodity dependent countries
and serious financial problems for the parastatals managing their commodity
subsectors.  This was especially the case for a number of Sub-Saharan African countries
dependent on coffee and cocoa.  International programs designed to provide financial
assistance to developing countries suffering balance of payment problems from declines
in commodity prices such as EU's STABEX and the IMF's compensatory financing
program had limited effects.  Moreover, the parastatals charged with stabilizing
domestic prices came under increasing pressure as commodity prices continued to fall.8
Indeed, motivation for reforms came in part from the rigidities in the pre-reform pricing
systems and their inability to cope with the post 1973 price volatility.
A significant push for market reform came from the World Bank, which
introduced Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) in 1980.  Initially the objective was to
financially assist developing countries with debt problems - especially in Latin America
and Africa - caused by poor fiscal management and exacerbated by the sharp oil price
increase in 1979.  The basic recommended policy was the retreat of the state from
economic life and the opening up of economic activity - especially in agriculture - to the
free play of market forces (p. 24, Mosley et al., 1gg1).
International organizations began to recommend market reforms, often as a
condition for financial assistance.  The Bank's SALs often accompanied devaluation
8  Farm support programs in developed countries were not immune.  Australia's wool stabilization scheme
failed in the 1980s (Bardsley, 1994) and both the US and the EU accumulated large and expensive
stockpiles  of commodities during the 198os only to be liquidated at high costs to taxpayers.
8prompted by IMF and this contributed in favor of exportable commodities including
many agricultural products.  Generally, the conditions that were applied to agricultural
commodity subsectors were significant reduction in government intervention in
determining prices, a reduction of the power of state marketing boards and elimination
of agricultural import subsidies (Mosley, 1987).  The basis for this policy approach drew
heavily on the development economists' arguments discussed earlier and from the
Bank's own experience  (Cleaver, 1987).  Also, as a practical matter, by the late 198os and
early l990s, many of the commodity parastatals were insolvent and many governments,
whether convinced of the merits or forced by events, began to revamp the subsector
marketing systems and policies.
The early history of agricultural market reforms and structural lending by the
World Bank is well reviewed in a 1997 World Bank Operations Evaluation Study
(Meerman, 1997.)  The author notes that by igglstructural lending relied heavily on
markets.  Conditions for the loans sought to (a) eliminate price controls; (b) develop
competitive local markets for inputs (land, agro-chemicals,  credit) and outputs; (c)
reduce state interventions in international trade to enhance integration into world
markets; (d) improve aspects of the regulatory systems; and (e) privatize inefficient
public enterprises (page 2).
Still, early World Bank structural lending for agricultural markets often focused
improving the efficiency of marketing boards by linking domestic prices to international
markets and by reducing subsidies.  In fact, prior to 1995, trade liberalization was rarely
a condition for World Bank agricultural lending (table 1).  Among the first 50
agricultural structural adjustment loans, only 10 - all approved after 1991 - fit the
market-based model.  Meerman attributes the shift in Bank policy to a combination of
factors including: a recognition among Bank staff and client countries that early
approaches to structural adjustment had failed to achieve their objective; empirical
results from World Bank and academic research that measured the costs of distorting
policies; and the positive examples of early reforms in Chile, China and elsewhere.
The shift in policy was formalized in a 1992 World Bank Operational Directive
(OD 8.60), Adjustment lending  policy.  The directive does not distinguish between
lending for agriculture or other sectors, but rather provides a clear motivation for
9structural adjustment, as an activity separate from macroeconomic stabilization
(Meerman, pages 29-30).  The directive recommends the elimination of price controls
and suggests variable tariffs to pursue stabilization goals.  Eliminating state marketing
boards and liberalizing trade are cited as policy changes that are likely to encourage
growth.  Policies of phased privatization and the replacement of general food subsidies
with targeted subsides are recommended as well.  The directive urges the strengthening
of a supporting regulatory environment and recognizes the fact that "adjustment
operations require strong political commitment"  (paragraphs 37-39).
The stated purpose of structural adjustment lending was to reduce poverty
through economy-wide growth.  An improved investment climate and better incentives
were to stimulate growth and consequently  changes in productive activities were to be
expected.  However, born of crises, the approach to reform, which combined aspects of
macroeconomic stabilization, fiscal constraint and structural change was without
obvious precedent.  Not all consequences of reform were anticipated and some were not
planned for - a topic that we return to in the context of the consequences of specific
market reforms.
Specific commodity and country consideiratioim
The general factors driving change were influenced by differing conditions among
commodities and potentially different outcomes from implementing reform in each of
the commodity markets.  Table 2 reports on the state of commodity market
interventions in 1999 and prior to the reform process.  While, as a general matter, most
governments adopted broad market-oriented economic strategies, the degree of market
reform differed significantly among crops.  For coffee and to a lesser extent cocoa, the
state monopolies that implicitly taxed producers gave way to liberalization.  For cotton,
policy approaches differed significantly between western and eastern Africa - due in
part to very different initial conditions.  For sugar, where industries grew dependent on
past government interventions, the process of privatization and market liberalization
was uneven in domestic markets and trade interventions remain common.
10Cocoa: As discussed earlier, the fiscal problems governments and the financial
difficulties of parastatals prompted market reforms in many cocoa producing countries.
Ironically,  cocoa prices and producing countries were less affected by the collapse of the
ICCA's buffer scheme simply because the stock program had not been very effective in
stabilizing cocoa prices.  (See Gilbert, 1996, 1997.)  The stabilization aspects of domestic
commodity programs also came under pressure.  Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire,
Ghana, Nigeria and Togo moved to free internal trade - although the reforms in Ghana
were partial.  World Bank lending also played a role in C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo,
while EU lending supported reforms in Cameroon.  Except for Ghana, state export
monopolies or restricting licensing arrangements were lifted as well (Varangis and
Schreiber 2001).
In the case of Togo, a prolonged general strike that lasted from late 1993 to mid
1994 also contributed to fiscal problems.  Ghana's limited reform in the cocoa subsector
in the early 1980s was required to correct an economic crisis and to improve cocoa
farmers' income.  The Nigerian cocoa subsector literally was reformed overnight in 1987
when the government decided to dismantle all the marketing boards and staunch the
boards' drain on the treasury.
Coffee:  Following the collapse of the economic clauses of the International  Coffee
Agreement most African countries moved to eliminate government export monopolies
in coffee - examples include Cameroon and C6te d'Ivoire, Madagascar,  and Uganda.  In
other countries, for example Ethiopia, it was the change in political regime that
prompted the reforms in the coffee subsector (Akiyama,  2001).  In most of the coffee
cases given in table 2, domestic and export markets were fully liberalized.  Structural
adjustment lending played a role in several of the countries.  For example, the World
Bank extended some measure of support in Cote d'Ivoire Madagascar, Tanzania and
Uganda.  Resistance to reforms was strong in many countries because the sub-sector
was an important source of government and foreign exchange revenues.  Furthermore,
reforms were difficult politically because the sub-sector employed a large number of
staff in parastatals and liberalization often meant abandoning cooperatives that had
long received special support by governments for both political and economic reasons.
11Cotton: By the 198os, the marketing and trade of cotton in most African
countries were handled in its entirety by state parastatals.  During the 1990S, a number
of countries initiated reforms, including Chad, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.  In
these cases, reforms occurred when parastatals became financially insolvent or found it
difficult to carry out the trade and producer financing responsibilities that, in turn,
severely limited their capacity to maintain ginning operations.  In West and Central
Africa, the pace of reform has been slower for several reasons.  First, production-related
problems were less severe than in East Africa.  Second, the state companies played a
larger role in all aspects of production and private ownership and related markets for
inputs and credit were less developed complicating the task of privatization.  Finally,
there was less agreement among donors and policymakers concerning the extent and
pace of reform.  Nonetheless, core problems related to the financial insolvency of the
parastatals and the low share of export price received by farmers together with larger
agreement among policymakers have prompted phased reforms in Burkina Faso, CMte
d'Ivoire, and Benin while others (e.g., Mali) will initiate reforms soon (Badiane et. al,
2002)9.
Sugar: In the l99os, many sugar-producing countries began domestic reforms
that often include privatization of state-owned sugar estates and sugar mills.  The main
factor contributing to reforms in sugar markets was the poor performance by the
publicly owned mills and estates (for example, Benin and CMte d'Ivoire).  For some
countries, privatization was also a way to revive an industry that declined during periods
of armed conflict (Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda).  Sugar reforms received some
encouragement by donor agencies.  For example, World Bank lending supported
reforms in Burundi, Chad, CMte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Uganda. Still, sugar trade policy
remains largely unreformed in Africa and most countries protect their domestic
industry.  Often, local communities have grown dependent on policy-dependent  sugar
industries, making the political cost of reform high (e.g. in Kenya).  Moreover, because
sugar programs are often self-financed through an indirect tax on consumers, these
programs have not faced the budgetary pressure generated by most policy interventions.
Consequently, governments frequently chose to increase protection rates rather than
9 Edwards (2000) provides some insights into the debate in the donor community.
12solve problems associated with money losing sugar industrieslo.  This option to transfer
resources from consumers removes the budgetary urgency that prompted reforms
among other parastatals.  For example, reforms associated with a World Bank loan to
Senegal that would have eliminated production, trade and marketing monopolies failed
to take place and, instead, transfers from consumers to the state-owned sugar company
were increased.
The sugar-related policies of several large producer-consumers,  especially the EU
and the US also contribute in direct and indirect ways toward a resistance to reform.  In
general, the presence of protectionist policies among donor countries dampens the call
for reforms in developing countries and provides political justification for continued
domestic interventions"l.  More directly, developed country policies also influence the
policies of countries that enjoy special access to protected US and EU markets (for
example,  Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritius and Zimbabwe), since the need to distribute the gains
from these preferential arrangement encourages central management of the industry.
4. CONSEQUENCES  OF MARKET REFORMS?
As a prelude to discussing the consequences  of reform, it is useful to address the
question of what was expected from reform.  It is not an easy question to answer.  First,
as already noted, the impetus for change came from many sources.  Many reforms were
born of crises and the goals of reform were not always clearly articulated.  Second, in
instances where the objectives were more clearly defined - for example, in documents
related to the World Bank's structural adjustment lending - the goals were broad to the
point where measurement became difficult.  Moreover, external factors unrelated to
policy and implementation decisions sometimes heavily influenced outcomes, especially
the timing of reforms relative to favorable or adverse market conditions.  Lastly, the
pace and persistence of reform efforts varied greatly among countries.
lo This is not uniquely, or even primarily an African problem.  See Larson and Borrell (2001) for examples
from other regions.
11  For example, the South African sugar industry had the following to say about considered reforms to
lower trade protection:  "The industry is committed to the review of the Sugar Act but believes that
while the international sugar environment remains distorted, any changes  to competition policy
must take place within the framework of an equitable sharing of proceeds  among growers, millers
and refiners.'  page 4, South African Sugar Association Annual report 2001/2002.
13To complicate matters, separate from cause-and-effect, the direct statistical
measures on how reforms affected households are difficult to come by since monitoring
procedures were rarely included in most reform programs.  Analysts have therefore
relied on alternative and indirect measures.  This has resulted in a divided and
controversial  literature.  It is also a literature that, for Africa, focuses on grain markets,
which have their own special featuresl2.
Before turning to a more focused look at the consequences of reform in Africa for
our four commodities of interest, we selectively report on general studies related to
agricultural market reforms for the region.  From this literature, a dominant view
emerges that interventions common in the 1980S worked in a way that taxed the
agricultural sector.  Beyond this generalization were sometimes compensating  policies -
especially related to input markets and food crops.  Several studies point to evidence
that reforms in Africa improved the domestic terms of trade for rural producers - a
group that includes many of Africa's poor.  Evidence linking this improvement in the
terms of trade to poverty reduction is more debated - due in part to the problems
discussed above.  The studies are broadly based on three approaches and provide a basis
for our later discussion of export market reforms.
Findings from related stludies of market reforms
Evaluations based on sector data
A priori, general structural adjustment loans were not intended to necessarily spur
growth in agriculture, but rather to improve overall economic performance.  In its own
evaluation process, the Bank rarely considered sector growth as a measure of success for
structural adjustment loans.  However, in some specific cases, adjustment loans were
expected to lead to increased agricultural output by removing constraints.  Meerman
reviews specific agricultural adjustment lending that was expected to improve
conditions for smallholder producers and result in expanded production.  Preparation
documents for early loans in Argentina, Ecuador, Kenya, Madagascar, Tanzania,  and
12  See World Bank, 1994; Engberg-Pedersen  et al., 1996 and Mosley et al., 1991 for early reviews.  Jayne
and Jones (1997) and Kherallah et al. (2002) review studies of grain market reforms in Africa.
14Zambia predicted increased production from agriculture generally or specific crops.  The
agricultural sector did expand rapidly in Kenya, averaging more than 4 percent annually
for the four years following the 1986 loan; and the 1986 loan in Madagascar, which
liberalized rice production, also led to an increase in rice production that exceeded
expectations.  However, growth did not follow loans to Argentina,  Ecuador Tanzania
and Zambia, where key reforms were not fully carried out.  More recently, Jayne et al.
(2002) report on reforms related to food markets in Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia
and Zimbabwe.  They also attributed a lack of success to partial and incomplete
implementation of market reforms.  An IFPRI study of grain market reforms in five
West African countries (IFPRI, 1996) finds reforms incomplete as well.  Mukhopadhyay
(1999) examined the relationship between trade reform and growth in nine African
countries.  He concluded that trade reforms were counter-productive because of
unfavorable international economic conditions.
In an early evaluation study of structural adjustment lending, Jayarajah, Baird
and Branson (1994) noted that, in some instances, reforms that reduced subsidies on
fertilizer markets had occurred while policies that kept output prices low remained in
place, thereby penalizing farmers.  In addition, when currency devaluations in some
countries boosted prices for both inputs and exported crops, farmers that produce non-
traded food crops saw their production costs rise without compensating increases in
output prices.  Relying primarily on sectoral data and modeling techniques, Sahn,
Dorosh and Younger (1997) found that many policies in Africa prior to reform were
most costly for rural agriculture.  Consequently, they concluded that reforms in
Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar,  Malawi, Niger and Tanzania that reversed the over-
valuation of exchange rates and the taxation of export crops benefited the rural poor.
Basu and Stewart (1995) used sector data to analyze the consequences of
structural adjustment on rural poverty.  They found that, though the terms of trade
improved for agriculture in twelve of the nineteen Sub-Saharan African countries in
their study, incomes and per capita food consumption fell in both adjusting and non-
adjusting countries.  They concluded that while adjusting countries were not worse off,
they did not fare noticeably better than non-adjusting countries.
15Spatial studies
Marketing boards were sometimes given the task of buying and selling agricultural
produce in areas that are geographically remote.  Consequently, liberalization can be
expected to affect the spatial distribution of prices.  In Ethiopia, Dercon (1995) found
evidence that market liberalization lowered transaction margins among regional grain
markets.  Also in Ethiopia, Jayne, Negassa and Myers (1998) found that, because of
improved marketing, liberalization of domestic grain markets was generally associated
with a rise in prices for exporting areas in Ethiopia and a decline in deficit regions.
In a study of grain markets in Ghana, Badiane and Shively (1998) attributed a
general lowering of food prices to market reforms, but noted significant regional
disparity.  Bassolet and Lutz (1999) used market integration tests to examine the effects
of liberalization of Burkina Faso's grain market.  They found that the markets are
integrated in the long run, but note remaining limits to market efficiency, including
perceptions that market reforms are incomplete or will be readily reversed under some
conditions.  Lutz, van Tilburg and van der Kamp (1995) report similar findings for Benin
maize reforms.
Evaluations based on household data
While difficulties remain with attributing cause and effect, household surveys provide
greater opportunity to document welfare gains and losses following reforms and to
consider distributional affects.  In an early study, Demery and Squire (1996) used
household surveys to examine the view that macroeconomic adjustment
disproportionately hurts the poor in Africa.  They point to evidence from household
surveys in six African countries to demonstrate that poverty was more likely to decline
in those that improved their macroeconomic balances than in those that did not. Like
Basu and Stewart, they found that changes in the real exchange rate improved rural
terms of trade, but also found that the changes immediately and favorably affected rural
incomes, benefiting the poor both directly and indirectly. However, they found that the
general gains did not always benefit the most poor.  Moreover, they also warned the
prospects for the poor are not rosy unless there is more investment in human capital
and better targeting of social spending.
16Structural adjustment loans rely on changing price signals to bring about
allocative and efficiency gains that can benefit poor households.  At the same time, it is
now well recognized that the same reforms can harm others.  Abdulai and Huffman
(2000) rely on survey data from rice-producing households in Ghana to test the notion
that changes in relative prices could lead to efficiency gains at the household level.  They
found that prices play an important role in household production decisions regarding
production and the use of inputs - including family labor.  Their econometric results
indicate that programs that improve education and improve access to credit are likely to
greatly improve on-farm productivity.  This would benefit producers, but not necessarily
landless rural households, unless the multiplier effects on employment are significant.
More recently, Appleton (2001) uses survey evidence from Uganda to show that
poverty levels dropped significantly following reforms'3.  Moreover, among rural
households poverty fell most sharply among smallholder producers of export crops -
primarily coffee - following the liberalization of the subsector. Appelton notes that
while the household data were consistent with sector data, the result differed from
perceptions registered in participatory surveys14.  Appleton confirmed his findings
under alternative definitions of poverty.  Using the same survey, Deininger and Okidi
(2001) found that changing price signals did bring about changes in household
production and input use.  Nonetheless, they also note regional disparities in the
benefits of market reforms with little advantage gained in northern communities, where
coffee production is less dominant.  Dercon and Krishnan (1996) found significant
location-related  effects from reform. Using household data from Ethiopia and Tanzania,
they found that differences in ability, location and credit could have overwhelming
effects on household choices, precluding significant allocative gains.  Similarly, using
survey data in Zambia, Alwang, Siegel and Jorgensen (1996) argue that remoteness and
'3In a related paper, Henstridge and Kasekende (2001) provide an example of the potential for
distributional effects from policy interventions motivated by macroeconomic  goals. As coffee prices
rose internationally, inflationary fears prompted a coffee stabilization tax.  As the authors note, the
collections under the tax were modest thereby allowing the benefits to farmers measured by
Appleton.
14  Differences between commonly used measures and perceptions of poverty are not uncommon.  See
Kanbur (2001) for a discussion.
17weak input markets precluded potential gains from market liberalization for many rural
poor.
Lessons from commodity market reforms
Studies that assess reforms of commodity subsectors face many of the same challenges
mentioned earlier; however, there are also simplifying elements related to commodity
markets.  The first is that, in the case of crops primarily exported, and in contrast to
grain market studies, consequences for domestic consumers can largely be ignored.
Second, policymakers frequently held out more specific expectations about what should
happen following commodity market reforms - most commonly a reversal of direct and
indirect transfers from producers.  Lastly, aspects peculiar to commodity markets can
lessen some measurement problems.  For example, the standardization that comes with
commodity markets facilitates comparisons of prices before and after market reforms
and the same constriction in marketing that facilitated government controls can help
with data collection'5.
As might be expected, a commodity-specific  approach comes with drawbacks as
well.  First, the perspective is partial while the benefits of reform are expected to include
intrasectoral effects.  Second, reforms are expected to bring about long-run changes to
physical and human capital formation, so the full impact and consequences occur over
time.  Finally, more so than with other types of reform, commodity market reforms are
closely tied with events in specific international  markets.  More often than not, luck and
timing, as much as policy and analysis, have shaped both perceptions and measures of
market reform outcomes.
Producer prices
In general, interventions in markets for coffee, cocoa and cotton were thought to divert
revenues from producers to other beneficiaries.  In such cases, producer prices were
5s  Coffee, which is easily stored and transported, presents its own data problems however.  Cross-border
trade activities designed to avoid taxation, custom delays or currency restrictions can distort
statistics.  For example, in 1996/97 Uganda exported 4.65 million bags of coffee while it produced
3.72 million bags; the difference appears to have come from the Democratic Republic of Congo.  Also,
see Henstridge (1999) for a discussion of coffee as a substitute for money.
18expected to increase relative to border prices following effective reforms because of
increased competition among traders as well as lower implicit and explicit taxation.
This prediction appears to have held true in many cases of market reform.  For
example, prices received by cocoa producers in Nigeria and Cameroon increased to well
over 70 percent of the fob price, up from 20 and 40 percent respectively, prior to
reforms (Varangis and Schreiber 2001).  Ugandan coffee producer prices increased from
40 percent prior to reforms to over 70 percent after the reforms (Akiyama, 2001).
Cotton producers in Tanzania received, on average, 41 percent of the export value of
their crop in the six seasons prior to reform and 51 percent for the six seasons following
reform (Baffes,  2002).  Larsen (2002) reports that cotton producer price shares in
Zimbabwe also rose (from 42 percent to 53 percent) following industry reforms.  Results
based on Townsend (1999) and Delgado and Minot (2000), reported in Kherallah et al.
(2002), also suggest that producers' share of export prices were higher in countries
where commodity market reforms have been completed when compared to countries
where reforms have been slow or have not taken place.
Nonetheless, when describing the consequences  of reform, it is important to
distinguish between the effects on revenue share and price levels.  This point is
illustrated by average coffee prices for 1987-89 and 1997-99 in table 3.  Between the
periods, world averages fell significantly for robusta coffee.  In Ghana, Madagascar and
Uganda, where producers were heavily taxed, producer shares grew dramatically
following reforms.  In Uganda, reforms were in place prior to a small price boom and
producers benefited in absolute terms as well.  In other countries, where interventions
were less heavy-handed,  the benefits of increased price share are masked by falling
international prices.  In a few instances, reforms remained incomplete through 1999 or
where reversed.  In Tanzania, coffee must pass through a central auction and policies to
encourage competition in internal markets have been reversed'6. In neighboring Kenya,
arabica coffees must also pass through a central auction.  In the case of Kenya, the
auctioning system appears to have helped control quality while improved competition
on either side of the auction allowed quality premiums to reach producers.  In Burundi
16 See Temu et al., 2001, for a detailed discussion of the Tanzanian coffee auction.
19and Rwanda, continued limited competition, taxes and falling prices created an
especially harsh situation for producers.
Reform also ended pan-territorial pricing for commodities in several countries,
so that, following reforms, producers received prices reflecting transport and other
costs.  In places where infrastructure was poor, farmers in farther away areas received a
much lower price compared to farmers in more accessible areas.  With liberalization,
traders and exporters tended to concentrate their purchases in more accessible areas.  In
least accessible areas, competition for purchasing the crop was low, and price
differentials were sometimes much greater that the difference in transport costs.  For
example, coffee farmers in remote areas in Madagascar receive around 40-50 percent of
the fob price, while farmers in more accessible areas receive between 60 and 70 percent
of the fob price (Akiyama, 2001).  Following reforms in Tanzania, cotton farmers in the
eastern part of the country found themselves with no buyers, prompting the Cotton
Board to intervene as the buyer of last resort (Baffes, 2002).
The characterization of export commodity interventions as anti-producer does
not hold for all commodities in Africa.  For sugar, true trade reform would have brought
a lowering of prices for highly protected producers.  Instead, producers were frequently
given added protection in order to facilitate the privatization of state-owned estates.  A
good example comes from C6te d'Ivoire where consumer prices rose 25 percent
following the privatization of SODESUCRE.  Consequently a significant portion of the
revenue raised by the sale of SODESUCRE constituted an indirect transfer from
consumers (World Bank, 1999).  These average effects can disproportionately affect the
poor, since budget shares on sugar are higher among the poor.  For example, in the
already-mentioned  case of Senegal, poor households expenditures on sugar comprise
about 12-13 percent of household budgets, compared to 7-8 percent among the non-
poor.  In Tanzania, a series of reforms from 1986 to 1992 removed internal trade
barriers and ended pan-territorial pricing, but also resulted in a six-fold increase in
consumer prices as consumer subsidies gave way to guaranteed cost recovery for the
sugar company, SODECO (Netherlands Development Cooperation  1992).
The prevalent approach of taxing consumers for the benefit of the sugar industry,
whether private or state-owned, is illustrated by the averages reported in table 4.  In all
20reported cases, domestic wholesale prices differ substantially from world prices, as given
by the ISO indicator price.  With the exception of Zimbabwe, where prices were kept
artificially low, interventions that boost domestic prices remain in place.
Price volatility
As discussed, price stabilization was a common stated objective of policy in many
African countries and some multilateral institutions until the 199os.  The international
programs are gone as are many domestic institutions and a debate continues as to
whether such changes have brought increased price volatility to domestic markets in
reforming countries.
For commodities that were taxed, the welfare consequences of reform may be
offsetting - that is, that reforms that boost producers share of export prices may well
compensate for increased price volatility.  See Larson (1993), Gilbert (1987 and 1997),
McIntire and Varangis (1999) and Hazell (1994) for discussions.  Nonetheless, the
elimination of effective stabilization schemes can bring about specific types of losses.
Groups that are vulnerable  may have limited ways to protect themselves from increased
price volatility.  Moreover, the formal and informal ways to self-insure may fail when
price declines are systemic or enduring (Alderman and Paxson, 1992).  Where safety
nets are incomplete, governments may have limited options to deal with price
variability.
In some instance, governments can take steps to facilitate the development of
risk-sharing arrangements  such as contract farming or access to formal options and
futures markets  (Morgan, Rayner and Vaillant, 1999; Anderson, Larson and Varangis,
2002)  However, seldom do commodity risk markets effectively span multiple years
(Gardner, 1989).  Consequently, the empirical question of whether domestic commodity
prices are more volatile following reform is an important one.
In terms of eventual outcomes, commodity market liberalization was expected to
result in a more direct transmission of both price levels and variability.  How this would
affect incomes in  the short-run was less clear, since reforms might well be followed by
periods of high prices and low volatility or the reverse.  Additionally, from an historic
perspective, the period since reform is brief, relative to past commodity price cycles
21(Cashin, McDermott and Scott, 2002).  As a result, evidence regarding reform and
changes in time-volatility may be circumstantial.  Moreover, in contrast to studies
concerning changes in spatial prices, studies of price volatility changes following reform
are rare.  In one country-and-commodity specific study, Karanja (2001) did find that
price volatility in domestic coffee prices did increase following reforms in Kenya.
Looking at aggregate data, and distinguishing between volatility and uncertainty, Dehn
(2000) provides evidence that after 1973 commodity price uncertainty for Sub-Saharan
African countries increased, although he found no evidence that uncertainty increased
during 1986-97 compared to 1973-85.
FAO collects and reports data on domestic producer prices and we used this data
to calculate variability for two periods, 1986-go and 1991-95 for 35 African countries for
cocoa, coffee, cotton and sugar17.  Not all countries produce all products, but country-
commodity combinations did not change from year to year for any of the countries.
Producer prices, which FAO reports in local currencies, were converted to US dollars,
using exchange rates from the IMF (2002).  Our measure of volatility T, is simply the
expression (p,, (t) - p,  (tW  summed over i and t where i represents commodity,j
represents country, t represents year and where the subscripted dot (.) represents the
mean over the appropriate index.  The aggregated measure,  T sums over i as well.  This
total sum-of-squares can be further decomposed into between-commodity sum-of-
squares, B(i) = n Y, (p,  - p  )2, and the within-commodity sum-of-
squares, W(i) = I  ,  X  ,  - p, )2, so that T = W(i) + B(i) (Scheffe, 1959.)
Under the conditions that international price volatility translated to local prices
were constant and price stabilization schemes effective, market reforms should bring
about an increase in T.  Further, if policies aimed at stabilizing prices are abandoned,
then producer prices in all countries should reflect international prices and only differ
by transportation  cost and quality differences.  To the extent these are fairly constant
17 1995 is the last year reported by FAO (2002).
22with time, then policy reforms should be associated with smaller deviations among
countries following market reforms- that is, W(i) should fall'8.
As shown in table 5, individually and collectively, the variance of the dollar-
denominated domestic prices, T and T(i), fell for the four commodities covered in this
paper.  Moreover,  the variation among countries,  W(i), increased between the two
periods.  The overall decline in T can probably be attributed to an overall trend in
international commodity markets.  The increase in W(i) is a bit more puzzling since it
holds for each of the four commodities.  As discussed below, the scale and pace of
reform varied greatly among commodities, but was widespread for coffee.  Moreover,
the absolute measure of variation among countries did fall; however by proportionately
less than the between-measure.  We are left to speculate whether this is because earlier
interventions that affected price levels did little to smooth annual price variability, or
whether the latent effects of trade reform were masked by events in international
markets.  What is clear however is that there is, for whatever reason, no evidence from
FAO's data that volatility increased between the two periods.
Supply response
The evidence regarding the effects of reforms on supply response has been mixed in
both direction and magnitude.  In the cases of coffee, cocoa, and cotton subsectors that
were taxed heavily before market reforms, supply was expected to respond positively.  In
some instances, this has been the case.  In both Uganda and Zimbabwe, cotton reforms
(which resulted in higher producer prices) have induced considerable supply response
(Baffes, 2001).  Uganda's coffee production also increased sharply after liberalization
(Akiyama, 2001).  However, cotton production has also increased in West Africa where
prices received by producers have been very low.  Cocoa production in C6te d'Ivoire and
Ghana, two countries with relatively low progress in cocoa market reforms and with low
producer price shares, has increased substantially in the last fifteen years (Varangis and
Schreiber 2001).
8  To see this, consider the price of coffee in countryj, p1j, equals the world price p,*, plus a quality and
location adjustment, xj, plus a stabilization payment sj, that is pj = p,* + xj + sj. The within measure is
based on (plJ-pl )2 = (Xj  - X.  + Sj - S.)2,  so that if stabilization payments disappear then the term (si-s)
disappears and W(i) falls.
23Further, supply response often occurs with significant lags.  For example, it took
four seasons before supply response took place in cotton in Uganda.  In some cases, a
supply response never takes place because of lack of investment due to uncertainty
regarding economic and other government policies.  An important factor that affects the
supply response is stakeholders' price expectations.  If farmers believe that producer
price increases resulting from reforms could be reversed, they are unlikely to invest and
there will not be much inter-sectoral factor movement (Jaeger, 1992; Akiyama, 1992).
Supply response of tree crops, by their physical nature, is slow.  In addition, aggregate
supply response tends to be much lower than individual commodity because in the
former case factors such as land and labor need to be transferred between sectors.  In
several countries, more than one commodity subsector was reformed at the same time.
Another reason for the lack of supply response is weak marketing institutions and
poor physical infrastructure, which implies that market reforms can eliminate one of the
key binding factors but so long as other binding factors exist, supply response to prices
is low (Krueger,  Schiff and Valdes, 1992; Poulton et al., 1999).  This is consistent with
Timmer's (1991) argument that getting prices right in the agricultural and marketing
sectors will not by itself induce the necessary private investment of competitive market
structure, and that removing inappropriate policies might be necessary but not
sufficient, in the absence of other institutional and legal reforms, to guarantee greater
private investment (p. 14).  Such seems to have been the case with Nigeria (cocoa) and
Madagascar (coffee).
A better indicator, related to supply, is changing productivity, but strong evidence
is missing on this measure as well.  In one of the few studies of reform on export crop
productivity, Amin (1999) considered how Cameroon's reform program affected major
export crops while controlling for prices and other factors.  He found evidence that the
programs improved productivity for all of Cameroon's major exports (cotton, cocoa,
robusta coffee and arabica coffee); however, only for robusta coffee were the results
statistically significant.
24Private sector activities and institutional changes
As discussed, policies are the instruments of change in market reform.  Included are the
institutions, the services provided by the state and the taxing authority of the state.
Private initiative is a dominant mechanism by which effective policy changes were
expected to bring improvements in efficiency and growth.  In Africa, state trading
continues, yet considerably fewer statutory monopolies or state-supported market
players remain.  Have then incentives changed sufficiently to elicit private response?
In cases of successful reform, policy changes have been the catalyst for attracting
private entrepreneurs into the liberalized sectors.  In several countries, private
investment (both domestic and foreign) increased considerably following market
reform, especially in the areas of processing facilities.  For example, in the case of cotton
in Uganda, a South African company invested in rehabilitation of two ginneries.  In
Zimbabwe, a multi-national company entered to purchase almost one quarter of the
1997/98 cotton output.  In CMte d'Ivoire, a number of ginneries were sold to a foreign
company while one third of domestic processing of cocoa was handled by a joint
venture.  A number of firms and individuals have invested in processing facilities and
coffee plantations in Uganda and local entrepreneurs have started nurseries to provide
seedlings of high-yielding varieties.
In most cases, effective private markets for commodity sales emerged quickly
when monopolies were lifted.  Nevertheless, where interventions were long-standing,
specific experience in marketing was limited and associated with former parastatal staff.
New participants enter the market with varying levels of capital and knowledge
emerged.  Consequently, in some cases, the search for a reliable partner by offshore
buyers was difficult and risky.  For example, after the reforms in coffee subsectors of
Uganda nearly 200 entrepreneurs entered the new export sector.  Within two years,
three-quarters were gone and 80 percent of exports were handled by ten firms.  While
farmers benefited early on from increased competition, the high search costs and
counter-party risks that characterized the early markets presented their own problems.
Subsequently,  Uganda introduced registration criteria and required bank guarantees for
exporters in order to safeguard the reputation of the system and lower transaction costs.
25Trader names, traded volumes and contact information were then published by the
UCDA.  Cote d'Ivoire acted in a similar manner following coffee market reforms.
Most marketing parastatals were given responsibility for raising trading capital
and in some cases the inability to continue this task prompted reform.  At the same
time, dismantling parastatals did not guarantee the private provision of working capital
for traders.  However, in most cases, systems of pre-export financing arose.  In such
systems, offshore buyers deposit working capital in the accounts of domestic traders as
loans.  The loans are offset when the domestic traders make physical deliveries to the
exporters.  In some cases, third-party entities verification of shipment quality and
volume triggers payments against trader loans.  Currency transactions  are one-way and,
because international exporters can access less expensive credit, financing costs are
reduced.
Inventory financing is potentially another way in which financing costs can be
lowered and price volatility managed (Larson, Varangis and Yabuki, 1998).  Though
common in developing countries in Latin America, the necessary regulatory framework
is often lacking in Africa (Coulter and Shepard, 1995). There have been initiatives to
develop inventory-financing  systems (e.g. in Ghana, Cameroon and Uganda), but
progress has been slowed by delays in drafting supporting legislation and by delays
associated with privatizing former-parastatal storage facilities
The provision of credit for inputs to smallholders has been more problematic.
For coffee and cocoa, production credit was rare prior to or following reform.  However,
monopolies on processing sometimes facilitated the provision of in-kind credit for
seeds, pesticides and fertilizer for cotton and sugar.  Under such schemes farmers
sometimes had little choice about the amount or cost of the inputs supplied; however
there is evidence to suggest that in-kind credit generated positive direct and indirect
benefits (Govereh, Jayne and Nyoro, 1999).  In some countries, competition among
cotton ginners following reform has allowed growers to avoid repaying in-kind loans.
Finding alternative workable contractual arrangements has been difficult in some
countries.  See Baffes (2002) for an example from Tanzania, Lundbaek (2000) for
Uganda and FSRP(2000) for Zambia.  Larsen (2002) provides a counter-example from
Zimbabwe.
26Changing policies redefined the role of government in the commodity markets.
In successful reforms, policymakers recognized the multiple tasks taken on by
commodity parastatals and reorganized parastatal staff accordingly.  For example, in
Cameroon and Uganda, marketing activities were hived off and the regulatory and
information services reorganized into institutions with regulatory responsibilities (e.g.,
ONCC in Cameroon, UCDA in Uganda).  To date, governments have been less successful
in attempts to develop new institutions to respond to the needs of the private sector.
One example is the already discussed efforts related to inventory financing.  Another
relates to efforts at increasing the transparency of domestic trade by establishing market
information systems.  Sheperd (1997) notes that such systems once introduced under
UN and donor auspices often fail to receive adequate recurrent funding.  In some
countries (e.g. Uganda and C6te d'Ivoire), cooperatives were expected to assume a
greater role in markets for inputs, credit and sales after the reforms, but cooperatives
have generally not been successful in taking on greater roles
Some governments have proven more successful in granting private entities a
role in policy making and more common now is the inclusion of representatives  of the
private sector stakeholders - farmers, processors, traders and exporters - in policy
formulating and implementing bodies.  Private sector representatives play a key role in
UCDA in Uganda and the Coordination Committee in Togo.  The more inclusive
approach is also evident in the provision of services to the subsector.  In Uganda,
UCDA's technical and financial assistance to nursery establishment by the private sector
and its collaboration with a private industry organization in training, quality control
personnel, promotion of Ugandan coffee abroad and dissemination of market
information to the industry are some examples.  In Togo, a private firm is providing
various services to the subsector including research, extension and farm inputs under a
technical agreement with the government.  However, smallholders remain loosely
organized in Africa, which limits their participation in policy-making,  even reforms
encouraged their participation.  For example, following reforms in Uganda, seats set
aside for farmers on UCDA were occupied by legislators from coffee-intensive districts,
since representative association, which existing for traders and millers, did not exist for
growers.
27In some countries, policymakers have not always been careful about how key
public goods will be provided for following reforms.  This seems to be most typical of
countries in which pressing financial crises prompted abrupt changes in policies and
contemporaneously made it difficult to fund public goods.  As noted, marketing boards,
in addition to performing marketing activities, were often charged with provided certain
important public services.  In some cases, the abolition of government marketing
agencies also threatened the provision of research,  extension, infrastructure
maintenance, quality control services, data collection and information services.
Examples include the termination of rural road maintenance in Cameroon, and the
demise of extension and research for coffee and cocoa in Togo'9.
For commodity research, the funding problems that often prompted reforms have
been perhaps a greater problem than the reform process itself2o.  In some cases, donors
have stepped in to fund research; however, Rukuni, Blackie and Eicher (1998) argue
that donor funding removed incentives for researchers to respond to smallholder needs.
Alston, Pardey and Roseboom (1998) suggest commodity levies to fund research specific
to export crops.  This approach was taken in Uganda was to consolidate commodity-
specific research programs into a central research organization.  In Uganda, the
National Agricultural Research  Organization conducts basic research for several major
commodities, funded by general revenues.  However, in the case of coffee, UCDA
provides additional money for target research topics funded by a small cess on exports.
5 KEY FACTORSS FOR SUCCESSFUL MARKET REFORMS
Experiences discussed here suggest that there is no single recipe for market reforms.
The design and process of reform depend critically on conditions policymakers face as
they initiate and implement reform.  These initial conditions often determine obstacles
and resistance to reforms and also dictate feasible instruments of reform.
Understanding some common elements that have emerged during commodity market
19 See, for example, criticisms of the reform process by Dorward,  Kydd and Poulton, 1999.
20 See Byerlee (1998) for a description of alternative agricultural research organizational structures.
28reforms - some general and some commodity specific - can contribute to the success of
reform.  In what follows, we discuss key factors for successful reforms.
Commitment of  government.  Because policy reforms often result in
redistribution of income, they have been subject to opposition by those benefiting from
the status quo.  Sometimes reforms involve governments reneging on long-standing
political commitments, or an implicit social contract with important sections of the
population.  Rodrik (1997) argues that this problem is especially acute for trade reform
in Africa because the beneficiaries of trade reform are unorganized rural producers
while better-organized urban consumers and direct beneficiaries of trade restrictions
lose under proposed reforms.  As a result, reforming governments must pay an upfront
political price for improved prospects for growth.  Therefore, governments embarking
on reform need to be committed,  and be willing to stand by its new vision to the public
(World Bank, 1998).  Commitment should leaders who represent broad national
interests because government officials directly involved in the subsector often have
vested interest in the old system (Bates, 1981; Barhan, 1989).  Governments'
commitment was a key factor in advancing reform in Uganda's cotton and coffee
subsectors.  Policymakers in Mali and Togo have also addressed and established a
consensus-building  mechanism during the reform process in order to avoid
backtracking (Akiyama, 2001).
Proper institutional structure. As mentioned, commodity market reforms
during the 1990S relied heavily on private markets and private decisions.  This
sometimes required governments and the private sector to take up tasks that were not
needed prior to reform.  Moreover, to the extent that these tasks relied on collective
actions, either by governments or by associations, policies prior to reform precluded the
development of market-supporting institutions.  In some cases, private initiative can
quickly bring about new approaches that are not fully anticipated; however, redirecting
the role of government requires organization and structure.
Often during the reform process, there is a need to modify legislation and rule
setting.  In Togo, an important element was formalizing of decisions taken into legal
texts that became the regulatory framework for the activity.  Legal and regulatory
provisions covered the criteria and requirements for exporting and marketing, the level
29of bank guarantees, provisions for quality controls, and the modalities of a price
information system.  In Uganda, regulations on the coffee sector were modified and
were monitored during the process of reform by a working committee of permanent
secretaries.  On the other hand, the lack of an appropriate regulatory framework
following liberalization  was one of the main problems in the case of Nigeria.  In
Cameroon, enforcement of regulations was weak creating uncertainty in the new system.
I1Trusion  ad  couDinatio  aong  iTae§aagders.  Involving the private
sector stakeholders in the reform process often contributes significantly to successful
outcomes.  Finding an effective and transparent mechanism to tap expertise within the
private sector without fostering rent-seeking is a difficult art.  Consultation and
participation of the private sector in the reform process was institutionalized in the
case of Uganda's coffee through their representation as board members of UCDA, and
in the case of Togo's coffee and cocoa through participating in the Coordination
Committee.  In Mali, cotton producers, seeking a greater voice in how their crop was
marketed, initiated a series of limited reforms to transfer some responsibilities from
the powerful government parastatal Compaignie Malienne pour le Developpment des
Textiles (CMDT) to local communities (Bingen 1998).
Proper seuencuing aen  pace.  The pace of reform is a critical part of the
reform strategy.  Indeed, Spooner and Smith (1991) argue that a series of poor
sequencing decisions limited post-structural  adjustment performance in many African
countries.  Choices to be made include whether to liberalize exchange and capital
markets prior to sector markets, external in advance of domestic, export commodity
prior to food markets and input markets prior to output markets2l.  Some important
factors that determine it include continuing dialogue among key actors, clear
understanding of asset ownership, food security considerations,  and the state of input
markets.
Proper sequencing from an economist's perspective may differ from the
perspective of political leaders.  Markets that are important to a country's economy may
also be important to systems of political support and stabilizing patronage systems.
21 See Kherallah and Govidan (1999) for a recent review of the sequencing literature.
30Finding a sequencing path that allows for sufficient political support and speeds
economic growth can be challenging.
In the end, the metrics of importance is usually a political perception.
Consequently, reforms are often slow where perceived risks are associated with reform
are high.  To some degree, the experiences of neighboring countries can be important in
shaping perceptions.  For example, in cocoa, some of the opposition to reforms in CMte
d'Ivoire and Ghana was attributed to problems associated with marketing reforms in
Nigeria and Cameroon.  Reforms are easiest politically when the commodity sector is in
disarray and high economic costs have been paid. Reforms to cotton markets came
sooner to East Africa, where, in several countries, the industry had been in decline than
to West Africa, where parastatal operations were larger, more functional and more
comprehensive22.
For many reasons, the perceived risks and benefits associated with reform will
differ among commodity subsectors.  Consequently, governments reform their
commodity markets sequentially.  This is the case in CMte d'Ivoire and Ghana where
coffee was liberalized first but cocoa's market reforms in CMte d'Ivoire came one year
later and Ghana's cocoa export trade has not yet been liberalized.  Similarly, arabica
coffee was the first to be liberalized in Cameroon, before the robusta coffee and cocoa
sub-sectors.  In Mozambique, IMF reforms that brought about agricultural price
liberalization in 1996 exempted cotton.
Reforming one set of markets before others changes relative prices and relative
incentives in a temporary way.  To some extent, the resource adjustments that are made
in response are short-term and may later be reversed.  However, where there is little
scope for substitution in production,  a sequential approach to reform is workable.
However, where there is scope for substitution, the consequences can be costly.  For
example, in Malawi, government concerns about food security led to policy between
1984 to 1987 that brought prices for export crops like cotton to world parity levels while
controlling food crop prices; the policy resulted in the unintended consequence of
lowering maize and groundnut supplies (Kherallah and Govindan,  1999).
31Frequently, governments choose to hold off on trade reform, while liberalizing
domestic markets.  When governments reform domestic markets, they often set the pace
of reform by controlling entry.  The case of coffee reforms in Uganda, where private
traders were licensed in a phased manner, illustrates this approach.  On the other hand,
in some cocoa and coffee producing countries, such as C8te d'Ivoire, Cameroon and
Ghana, reforms started with the gradual liberalization in the internal market, while
some price controls were retained at the border.  In Cameroon, and CMte d'Ivoire
liberalization of the export market came at a later stage, while Ghana has yet to abolish
its export monopoly in cocoa.  Gradual market reforms sometimes have merits as hasty
liberalization often leaves producers deprived of key services that are provided by a
government agency.  A prime example is already discussed case of cocoa reform in
Nigeria where research, extension and quality control functions services vanished
following market reform.
Nevertheless,  delaying reforms can be costly as well and the costs come in many
forms.  In the case of Uganda, the state-owned coffee processing plant at Bugolobi
declined in value as privatization plans were delayed.  In the already-mentioned cases of
sugar markets, governments often begin the privatization by setting high tariff
protection; however, few countries have moved to reduce the protection subsequently.
Indeed, the policy becomes incorporated into the value of the enterprises and the firms
require continued support in order to finance their leveraged purchase.  In some
instances, delays in adopting sector reforms following macroeconomic reforms works to
boost the effective tax on producers.  Dione and Teff (1996) document how government
price controls reduced producers' share of cotton revenue from roughly 50 percent to 28
percent or less immediately following currency devaluations in Mali, Niger, Senegal and
Chad.
Moan°rinDg  andL ellsazuan  l  of hp  es°  o  Monitoring, evaluation and
analysis of the subsector before and during reform is often critical for a successful
outcome.  Joint evaluations by the Government of Uganda and the World Bank were
conducted twice for Uganda's coffee subsector during the reform process.  A number of
22 Some writers see the costs of dismantling government monopolies in cotton as exceedingly high.  See,
for example, Araujo-Bonjean and Brun (2001).
32detailed studies were conducted before and during Togo's reform of coffee and cocoa
subsectors and this had the effect of gaining supporters for the reform especially in the
private sector.  Similarly, there was an evaluation of the 1994/95 reforms in C8te
d'Ivoire for coffee and cocoa.
6. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
During most of the 20th century, countries established development policy frameworks
characterized by intervention in primary commodity markets.  While the instruments of
intervention varied among countries and among crops, a dominant architecture arose
based on a marketing-board single channel for exports and imports; state ownership of
processing centers such as cotton gins and sugar mills; administered domestic prices,
normally spatially invariant and often invariant within a crop season.  At the same time,
international institutions took up the task of finding collective instruments to stabilize
prices and reverse declining terms of trade.  The interventions were encouraged by the
prevailing policy recommendations of development economists and development
institutions.  Gradually, as the prescribed policies generated their own problems and
produced limited success, economists and policymakers turned increasingly toward
market-based approaches.  This advice took on institutional form as the World Bank
and other organizations began a series of structural adjustment loans and credits.  At
the same time, steady productivity gains in agriculture, transport and communications
eroded the efficacy of intervention instruments.  International commodity agreements
failed and most parastatal agencies were financially strained.  A series of political and
economic events triggered a rapid series of reforms.
The consequences and pace of reform varied among commodities and among
countries.  For the most part, existing policies taxed commodity exports and reform
brought producers - primarily smallholders - a greater share of traded value of their
crop.  In other instances, removing export obstacles simply revealed additional
constraints that limited gains, including institutional weaknesses related to earlier
regimes.  In a few cases associated with sugar market reforms, tariffs rose rather than
fell in order to promote privatization, benefiting domestic producers at the expense of
domestic consumers.
33Country experiences indicate that the pace and sequencing of reforms is
dependent on both the natures of the intervention and the expected consequences -
economic and political - of reform.  As a result, policymakers need to understand key
initial conditions in markets and in public and private institutions as well as their
potential contribution.
Experiences examined in this paper suggest that the factors impeding and
prompting market reform are as likely to be political as economic.  Hence, one main
consequence of the reforms has been a shift of financial and political power from the
government to the private sector.  This creates a new dependence on private sector
participants.  It also requires public organizations to abandon some tasks, but also to
take others on board.
Even where market reforms have been successful, there are continuing issues
facing the agricultural commodity subsectors as well as new ones that emerge related to
reform, but also arising from evolving market conditions.  Market reform is an
important first step because it allows markets to respond dynamically to a wide range of
changing conditions, but reforms do not guarantee growth nor address related social
needs.  Addressing these continuing and emerging issues is a challenge for the
developing community at large.  These issues include those related to continued
commitment of decision-makers, weak or missing factor markets - especially for credit
and insurance, research and extension, price information and volatility, producers'
organizations, distortions in international markets, and weak social and physical
infrastructure.
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42Table i: Conditions under World Bank agricultural structural adjustment
loans in Sub-Saharan Afica, 1980-1995
Country  FY  Change prices  Price reform  Liberalize  markets
Producer  Consumer  Export  Producer  Consumer  Export  Domestic  Trade
Sudan  1980  1  1
Tanzania  1981  1  1
Malawi  1983  2
Nigeria  1984  1
Sierra Leone  1984
Zambia  1985  2  I
Madagascar  1986  1  1  1  2
Somalia  1986  1  2
Kenya  1986  3
Tunisia  1987  2  1  2
Central African Republic  1988  3
Burundi  1989  1
Somalia  1989  1  1  1
Tunisia  1989  4
Cote d'Ivoire  1990  1  3  2
Mauritania  1990  1  1  3
Tanzania  1990  3  1  6
Malawi  1990  2  1
Mali  1990  1  1  1  1
Uganda  1991  2  I
Kenya  1991  1  2
Ghana  1992  2  3
Burkina Faso  1992  3  1
Senegal  1995  3  3  3  1  1
Source: Meerman,  1997.Table  : Tirade reforms for cocoa, coffee cotton, aimd sugar in selected comitries
Production  and trade controls  Domestic  market controls
before reforms  1999  before reforms  1999
Cocoa
Cameroon  restricted export licensing  liberalized; private  prices and margins set by goverunent  liberalized
Congo  state export monopoly  liberalized;  private  state purchasing monopoly  liberalized
Cote d'lvoire  restricted export licensing  liberalized;  private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Ghana  state export monopoly  state export monopoly  state purchasing monopoly  partial  privatization
Nigeria  state export monopoly  liberalized;  private  state purchasing monopoly  liberalized
Togo  state export monopoly  liberalized; private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Coffee
Cameroon  state export monopoly  liberalized;  private  prices and margms set by govermment  liberalized
Central African  state export monopoly  liberalized;  private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Republic
Congo  state export monopoly  liberalized;  private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
C6te d'lvoire  restricted export licensing  liberalized; private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Ethiopia  restricted export licensing;  limited private exporting  mandatory auction and state control  mandatory auction; traders
semi state monopoly  cannot be exporters
Gabon  state export monopoly  liberalized; private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Guinea  state export monopoly  liberalized; private  prices and margins  set by government  liberalized
Kenya  restricted export licensing  restricted export licensing  prices set, but linked to world prices  mandatory auction
Madagascar  restricted export licensing  liberalized; private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Nigeria  state export monopoly  liberalized; private  purchasing monopoly by cooperatives  liberalized
Rwanda  state export monopoly  liberalized; private  controlled by parastatal  liberalized
Sierra Leone  state export monopoly  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Tanzania  state export monopoly  mandatory  auctions  mandatory auction  mandatory auction
Togo  state export monopoly  liberalized;  private  prices and margins set by government  liberalized
Uganda  state export monopoly  liberalized;  private  purchasing monopoly by cooperatives  liberalized
Coton
Benin  state export monopoly  state export monopoly  state purchasing monopoly  state purchasing  monopoly
Burkina Faso  state export monopoly  state export monopoly  state purchasing monopoly  state purchasing  monopoly
COte d'Ivoire  state export monopoly  partial liberalization  state purchasing monopoly  partial liberalization
Central African  state export monopoly  state export monopoly  state purchasing  monopoly  state purchasing  monopoly
Republic
Chad  state export monopoly  state export monopoly  state purchasing  monopoly  state purchasing monopoly
Mali  state export monopoly  state export monopoly  state purchasing monopoly  state purchasing monopoly
Tanzania  state export monopoly  no restrictions; private  state purchasing  monopoly  no controls, private
Togo  state export monopoly  state export monopoly  state purchasing monopoly  state purchasing monopoly
Uganda  state export monopoly  no restrictions;  private  state purchasing  monopoly  no controls, private
Zimbabwe  state export monopoly  no restrictions; private  state purchasing monopoly  no controls, private
(continued)
44Table 2: Trade reforms for cocoa, coffee cotton, and sugar in selected countries (continued)
Production  and trade controls  Domestic market controls
before reforms  1999  before reforms  1999
Sugar
Benin  state sugar company  mixed private-public company;  state monopoly  liberalized
medium tariffs
Burundi  state sugar company  export and currency restrictions  state monopoly  state monopoly
Chad  state sugar company  state sugar company  state monopoly  state monopoly
C6te d'Ivoire  state sugar company  private companies; high tariffs  state monopoly  liberalized
Ethiopia  state sugar company  liberalized; low tariffs  state monopoly  liberalized
Gabon  state sugar company  private monopoly;  high tariffs  state monopoly  liberalized
Gambia  state trade monopoly  liberalized;  low tariffs  state monopoly  liberalized
Kenya  state trade monopoly  partly privatized management;  state monopoly  liberalized
high tariffs; ad hoc
interventions
Malawi  private trade monopoly  liberalized; moderate tariffs  private monopoly  liberalized
Mauritius  government managed  government managed  government managed  government managed
Mozambique  state trade monopoly;  partial government ownership;  state/private  monopoly  liberalized
high tariffs  high variable tariffs
Niger  state sugar company  privatized; moderate tariffs  state monopoly  regulated prices
Nigeria  state sugar company  state owned mills  state monopoly  liberalized
Rwanda  state sugar company  privatized, liberalized;  state monopoly  liberalized
moderate tariffs
Senegal  private monopoly  renegotiated land and water  private monopoly  liberalized
rights; high tariffs
Uganda  state trade monopoly  liberalized; moderate tariffs  state monopoly  liberalized
Zimbabwe  private/public  private/public monopoly  regulated prices  ad hoc interventions
monopoly
Note: Information on pre-reform status taken from World Bank (1994) and additional documents.  Post-reform description taken
from World Bank documents and discussion with World Bank staff. State monopoly includes mandated sales through cooperatives.
45TalRe 3: IFroUuer  pnRces for coffee anmil  their shauire of
iterationi  1prnces, fore selectedi couDtuie¶s, ng)7-9 andl
11997-99 avelru 0 ge-q 0
Price, US cents per  Share of indicator
pound  price
1987-89  1997-99  1987-89  1997-99
Arabicas
Brazil milds indicator  108.99  125 82
Ethiopia  52.98  86.13  0.49  0.68
Colombian milds indicator  115.30  152. 73
Kenya  87.91  156.66  0.76  1.03
Tanzania  65.07  90.98  0.74  0.58
Other milds indicator  94.20  142.73
Burundi  66.63  51.93  0.71  0.36
Carneroon  67.25  66.19  0.71  0.46
Rwanda  90.20  51.83  0.96  0.36
Uganda  63.24  129.59  0.67  0.91
Robustas
Robusta indicator  90.47  76.32
Angola  92.83  43.93  1.03  0.58
Cameroon  62.16  35.49  0.69  0.47
Central African Republic  54.53  35.24  0.60  0.46
C6te d'lvoire  57.01  39.34  0.63  0.52
Gabon  74.12  48.98  0.82  0.64
Ghana  35.30  40.16  0.39  0.53
Madagascar  30.06  45.58  0.33  0.60
Tanzania  35.22  54.30  0.39  0.71
Togo  54.33  38.67  0.60  0.51
Uganda  38.69  81.13  0.43  1.06
Note: The ICO indicator price is a weighted average of
markets in Europe and the US. The ICO uses separate
indicator prices for the three groups of arabica
producers included in the table.
Source: International Coffee Organization
46Table 4: Wholesale refined sugar prices in selected
countries relative to world prices, 1988-go and 1997-98.
1988-1990  1997-98
US cents/pound
ISO indicator price  11.86  12.44
Ratio of domestic to indicator price
Madagascar  1.96  1.64
Mauritius  0.80  1.82
South Africa  1.80  1.48
Swaziland  1.34  1.71
Zimbabwe  1.14  0.71
Source: International Sugar Organization Year Book.
47Table 5: Analysis of producer
price variance,  1986-90 and 1991-
95.
share of T
All commodities  T  W(i)  B(i)
1986-1990  1.00  0.52  0.48
1991-1995  0.54  0.61  0.39
Cocoa
1986-1990  0.13  0.47  0.53
1991-1995  0.05  0.61  0.39
Coffee
1986-1990  0.50  0.73  0.27
1991-1995  0.25  0.90  0.10
Cotton
1986-1990  0.23  0.12  0.88
1991-1995  0.18  0.18  0.82
Sugar
1986-1990  0.14  0.49  0.51
1991-1995  0.06  0.65  0.35
Note: The total sum-of-squares have been scaled to that T(1986-0) =  1.00.
Source:  FAO, IMF and authors' calculations.
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